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JESUS VASQUEZ, Appellant, v. ROBERT ALAMEDA
et al., Respondents.
[1] Automobiles-Appeal-Harmless Error-Instructions.-In an
act.ion for injuries sustained by a man who, after joining the owner of a non operable automobile and a third man in
pushing the car from its position of safety on private property
onto a three-lane highway, and after flagging another automobile which stopped in the center lane and started to back
behind the stalled car in order to push it, found himself under
a truck which came from the rear, alleged errors in instructing
the jury, particularly in overemphasizing plaintiff's burden
of proof, did not result in a miscarriage of justice and did not
warrant a reversal, where the evidence amply supported an implied finding that plaintiff's conduct in actively participating
in moving an inert object from a place of safety on private
property to a place of danger on the public highway, where
it constituted an obstruction to traffic, was a proximate contributing cause of the accident which barred recovery.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Monterey County. Stanley Lawson, Judge. Affirmed.
Action by pedestrian for damages for personal lDJuries
suffered in a highway accident. Judgment for defendants
affirmed.
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Automobiles, § 412 et seq.
licK. Dig. Reference: [1] Automobiles, § 385-L
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Boccardo, Blum, Lull & Niland, Malcolm K. Campbell and
Edward J. Niland for Appellant.
Hoge, Fenton & Jon~s, Lewis L. Fenton, Campbell, Custer,
Warburton & Britton, Alfred B. Britton, Jr., W. R. Dunn,
Low & Duryea and Remington Low for Respondents.
SCHAUER, J.-Plaintifl' appeals from an adverse judgment
entered pursuant to a jury's verdict in his action to recover for
personal injuries suffered in a highway accident. We have
concluded that plaintiff's claims of error in the jury instructions are immaterial and need not be discussed because the
uncontradicted evidence overwhelmingly supports the jury's
implied determination that plaintiff's own conduct at the least
constituted negligence which proximately contributed to his
injuries. Hence, no miscarriage of justice is shown and the
judgment should be affirmed.
At about 1 o'clock on a March morning in 1954 plaintiff met
one Vargas in a parking lot near the city of Santa Clara. On
the parking lot was a Plymouth automobile owned by Vargas.
The automobile was not in operable condition; its engine
could not be started. Rain was falling at the time. Plaintiff,
Vargas, and a third man joined in pushing the nOll operable
automobile from its position of safety on the private property
onto the highway, which at that point had three lanes, plus
hard shoulders, and flat areas of dirt or gravel beyond the
shoulders. The highway was straight for at least a half mile
in each direction, and the posted speed limit was 45 miles an
hour. The three men pushed the Plymouth, with its lights
on, into the right hand, eastbound, lane of the highway where
they allowed it to come to rest.
Plaintiff thereupon walked a short distance to the rear of the
Plymouth and flagged down a car driven by defendant Greenley. Greenley stopped in the center lane, to the left of the
Plymouth, and then started to back into the right hand lane
behind the Plymouth in . order to push it. While backing
Greenley saw a truck driven by defendant Rutkowski coming
from behind on the outer shoulder. Afraid that the truck
was so wide it could not clear vehicleR or objects in the right
hand lane, Greenley stopped his car partly in the center
lane and partly in the lane to the ri~ht. Rutkowski, who
bad seen the two cars occupying the right hand and center
lanes, had' decided to pass them on the shoulder. As he passed
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the Plymouth he saw plaintiff standing behind it in the rG;i:~~(

'P1s:, to the right.

Defendant Alameda, driving in the same direction behind
Rutkowski, saw red tail Hghts in the right hand lane ahead of
him and other lights off to the right. He moved into the
center lane to pass and did not see Greenley's car, partly
in that lane, until it was too late to stop. He struck the side
of Greenley's car, shoving it into the Plymouth, which was
in turn moved forward by the impact. When Rutkowski heard
the crash, he stopped his truck a short distance ahead of the
Plymouth. Plaintiff testified that as he was standing on the
shoulder next to the Plymouth after Greenley had started to
back, he saw the lights of an approaching vehicle about 15
to 20 feet away in the right hand lane of the ~llighway. The
next thing he remembered was coming to his senses as he lay
on his stomach with part of the left rear wheel of Rutkowski's
truck pressing on his left side and shoulder.
[1] As grounds for reversal plaintiff complains of various :'.
asserted errors of the court in instructing the jury, and urges
in particular that the plaintiff's burden of proof was improperly and prejudicially overemphasized. However, the basic
facts recited hereinabove make it altogether clear that plaintiff
deliberately and actively participated in moving an inert
object-Vargas' nonoperable automobile-from a place of
safety on private property to a place of danger on the public
highway where it obviously constituted an obstruction to
traffic. Whether, as has been suggested, plaintiff thereby aided
and abetted in creating a public nuisance (see Oiv. Code,
§§ 3479, 3480; Pen. Code, § 370) we need not determine because, on any reasonable view of the evidence, the implied
finding of the jury that his conduct was a proximate contributing cause of the accident which barred recovery, is amply
supported.
If his conduct be regarded as creating a nuisance
plaintiff's liability to others for damages proximately caused
by it would be, insofar as his own act is concerned, absolu1e
(Stockton Automobile Co. v. Confer (1908), 154 Cal. 402,
405 [97 P. 881]; Curtis v. Kastner (1934),220 Cal. 185, 188191 [3, 4] [30 P.2d 26]; Calder v. City &; County of San
Francisco (1942), 50 Cal.App.2d 837. S3P !1] [123 P.2d
897]) ; i.e., anyone injured by plaintiff's unlawful act could,
.roleS!; barred by such other's own contributory negligence,
recover from plaintiff as from an insurer. It is, therefore,
manifest that such plaintiff, if we take the view that he
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participated in creating a nuisance, may not recover against
anyone for injuries, to the causation of which the nuisance
proximately contributed, even though a defendant's negligence
may have also contribu'ted proximately to the accident. The
result, of course, must be the same if plaintiff's conduct be
regarded as mere negligence which contributed proximately to
cause the accident.
Considering the entire record we are ~atisfied that the
jury's implied finding-that plaintiff was at the least guilty
of negligence which contributed proximately to cause his
injuries-is clearly and overwhelmingly supported. It follows that, even if we assume the errors urged by plaintiff,
no miscarriage of justice is shown and a reversal is not permissible under the limitations of section 4% of article VI of the
California Constitution. (See People v. Watson (1956), 46
Ca1.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243] ; Vallejo &; Northern R. R. Co.
v. Reed Orchard Co. (1915), 169 Cal. 545, 554 [147 P. 238}.)
The judgment is affirmed.
Shenk, J., Spence, J., and McComb, J., concurred.

)

TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent on the ground that numerous
seriously erroneous instructions operated to deny plaintiff a
fair trial in a fact-context so complicated that the jury could
have as plausibly found for plaintiff as against him. The
pile-up of erroneous instructions matched the pile-up on the
highway, and their total effect was bound to be prejudicial
when the facts themselves invited so many possibilities of
conjecture as to negligence and causation.
Even in fact situations less obscure than this one the court
need not find that it was more probable than not that errors
influenced the jury to deem them prejudicial. It must deem
them prejudicial if it finds it not improbable that had they
been absent another result 'would have been reached. Otherwise it would be declaring errors harmless in the face of
a substantial chance that they were not, thereby depriving the
appellant of the trial to which he was entitled. "[T]he fact
that there exists at least such an equal balance of reasonable
probabilities [as to leave the court in serious doubt as to
whether error influenced the jury] necessarily means that the
court is of the opinion 'that it is reasonably probable that a
result more favorable to the appealing party would have
been reached in the absence of the error.'" (People v.
Watson, 46 Ca1.2d 818,837 [299 P.2d 243].)
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Obviously we must assume that juries conscientiously heed
instructions given them by the trial court. Were we to assume
the contrary, apprllate review of instructiulls wou~d be meaningless, since no instrl1ctions could then be deemed prejudicial.
I t also bears emphasis that except when the evidence compels only one conclusion, it is for the jury to determine the
issues of negligence and causation. In ruling on the prejudicial effect of error, we do not determine how we would have
decided these issues had the decision been ours. We do not
hold error harmless merely because we would have reached
the same conclusion as that reached by the jury, for we are
not the triers of fact. Our task is to review the whole record
and to determine in that context whether there was a substantial chance that error influenced the jury in reaching
its verdict.
The determination of the majority that it is unnecessary to
consider errors in the instructions on issues other than contributory negligence necessarily rests on the conclusion either
that it is improbable that the jury decided the case on any
issue other than contributory negligence, or that the evidence
on that issue so overwhelmingly supported the result as to
make any other result improbable.
I find neither of these conclusions tenable. There was
substantial evidence to support a verdict for plaintiff on other
issues. On the issue of contributory negligence, the jury
could reasonably have concluded that plaintiff was not contributively negligent. It is therefore impossible to determine
whether the jury reached a verdict based solely on that issue
or whether it followed erroneous instructions on the issues
of negligence and causation. Where the uncertainty surround·
ing the result looms so large, errors perforce also loom large.
Anyone of them might have influenced the jury in reaching a
verdict that cannot be clearly related to any single issue,
whether of contributory negligence, negligence, or causation.
To begin with contributory negligence, how can we be sure
that a jury has found anything unreasonable in the conduct of
pushing a disabled vehicle on a highway to start it when the
traffic is light, the road straight, and the visibilty good enough
to reveal lights of all the vehicles involved T To push a car
along a highway, even at night, does not constitute negligence
as a matter of law (Shannon v. Thomas, 57 Cal.App.2d 187,
194-195 [134 P.2d 522); Wright v. Ponitz, 44 Ca1.App.2d
215,220 [112 P.2d 25]), and the jury and the trial court, in
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the first and second of the foregoing cases respectively, determined that such conduct is not negligence. 1 A comparable
determination in this case would be at least a reasonable
probability, not a mere possibility.
This probability is not diminished by the possible inference
that plaintiff aided and abetted Vargas in violating section
582 of the Vehicle Code. Although we can only conjecture, it
is reasonable to assume that the jury was concerned with the
total conduct of plaintiff, not simply with the isolated act of
stopping the car. It is questionable that it created greater
hazard when stopped than when pushed. Nothing in the
evidence would compel a jury to infer that plaintiff aided and
abetted Vargas in violating the statute. While at the wheel
of his own car, Vargas directed where it should go. Plaintiff
was only pushing, and when the car stopped, the other man
who had also been pushing went back to the restaurant.
Plaintiff could not remove the car from the highway without
Vargas'8 cooperation. The burden of proof on contributory
negligence was on defendants; yet they made no effort to
establish that plaintiff and Vargas planned to stop or leave
the car on the highway if they could not get it started or that
Vargas wanted plaintiff to assist him in moving his car onto
the shoulder or was willing that he should do so. The jury
could thus reasonably conclude that defendants did not sustain
their burden of proving that plaintiff violated section 582,
and that plaintiff had no alternative to acquiescing in Vargas's
decision to stop the car on the highway to await additional
help. We cannot ignore this probability.
We are then bound to consider whether error was prejudicial in the instructions on the other issues of negligence and
causation on which the verdict could turn. The evidence was
sufficient to support findings against Greenley, Rutkowski, and
lThese cases also make clear that the nonnegligent use of the highway
to start a ear by pushing it does not constitute the creation or mainte·
nance of a public nuisance. I'enal Code section 370 provides that" Any·
thing which .•• unlawfully obstructs the free passa~e or use ... of ..•
any ..• highway, is a public nuisance." (See also Civ. Code ~~ 3479,
3480.) The key word in this definition is, of course, the word "unlaw·
fully." Neither the Shannon nor Wright cases expressly referred to
nuisance, but there is no magic in that word. Since contributory negli·
gence was not found in those cases, the conduct involved was necessarily
found to be a reasonable and therefore lawful use of the highway. As the
court in the Shannon case pointed out, "It certainly cannot be said
as a matter of law that the conduct of an automobile drh'er in pushing
his vehicle along the highway and toward the right-hand curh in an
effort to start it when his battery failed is not a legitimate and prudent
use of the highway." (57 Cal.App.2d at 195, italics added.)
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Alameda on the issues of negligence and proximate cauee.tt
was for the jury to determine whether Greenley was negligent
in stopping alongside Vargas's car, thereby blocking both
lanes available for eastbound traffic, or in attempting to back
into the right lane in the face of the oncoming truck. In any
event, plaintiff had no reason to foresee that Greenley might
be negligent in the aid he rendered. "It is ancient learning
that one who assumes to act, even though gratuitously, may
t.hereby become subject to the duty of acting carefully, if he
acts at all." (Cardozo, J. in Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y.
236, 239 [135 N.E. 275, 23 A.L.R. 1425] ; Hayes v. Richfield
Oil Corp., 38 Ca1.2d 375,384 1240 P.2d 580] ; Perry v. D. J.
& T. Sullivan, Inc., 219 Cal. 384, 390 [26 P.2d 485] ; Jano/sky
v. Garland, 42 Cal.App.2d 655, 657 [109 P.2d 750].) Whether
Rutkowski should have passed on the shoulder and whether
Alameda should have seen Greenley's car before it was too
late to stop were also questions for the jury. As to the cause of
plaintiff's injuries, the jury could reasonably have concluded
that plaintiff had been hit by Rutkowski's truck, thrown
against or under it by the collision of the other vehicles, or
injured by a combination of circumstances.
The trial court gave the following instruction on assumption
of risk:
"One is said to assume a risk when he freely, voluntarily
and knowingly manifests his assent to dangerous conduct or
to the creation or maintenance of a dangerous condition,
and voluntarily exposes himself to that danger, or when he
knows that a danger exists in either the conduct or condition
of another, or in the condition, use or operation of property,
and voluntarily places himself, or remains within the area
of danger .
•• One who thus assumed a risk is not entitled to recover
for damage caused him without intention and which resulted
from the dangerous condition or conduct to which he thus
exposed himself .
•• Distinction should be noted between the assumption of
risk just described, which bars recovery, and the ordinary
and necessary acceptance of common risks such as surround
'.lS all and that lie in the possibility that other persons will
not perform their duties toward us. As to this latter kind of
everyday risk,. one will not be barred from recovery for damage by the fact, if it be a fact, that while he, himself, is
exercising ordinary care, and when there is nothing in the
circumstances that either cautions him, or would caution a
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reasonably prudent person in like position, to the contrary,
he assumes that others will perform their duties toward him
and acts on that assumption."
The last sentence of this instruction confuses the defenses
of contributory negligence and assumption of risk. It erroneously suggests that if in the exercise of due care the plaintiff
would have known of the danger of the defendant's negligence, he has assumed the risk of such conduct. "The defenses
of assumption of risk and contributory negligence are based
on different theories. Cont.ributory negligence arises from
a lack of due care. The defense of assumption of risk, on the
other hand, will negative liability regardless of the fact that
plaintiff may have acted with due care. [Citation.] It is
available when there has been a voluntary acceptance of
a risk and such acceptance, whether express or implied, has
been made with knowledge and appreciation of the risk.
[Citation.] Where the facts are such that the plaintiff must
have had knowledge of the hazard, the situation is equivalent
to actual knowledge, and there may be an assumption of risk,
but where it merely appears that he should or could have discovered the danger by the exercise of ordinary care, the
defense is contributory negligence and not assumption of
risk." (Prescott v. Ralphs Grocery 00., 42 Ca1.2d 158, 161·
162 [265 P.2d 904].)
Moreover, an instruction on assumption of risk would not
be proper in any event, for in the circumstances of the case,
the defense was not available to defendants. "While a person, if fully informed, may assume the risk even though the
dangerous condition is caused by the negligence of others
(Prescott v. Ralphs Grocery 00., supra, 42 Cal.2d 158, 162),
'The plaintiff does not assume the risk of any negligence which
he has no reason to anticipate, but once he is fully informed
of it, it is well settled that the risks arising from such negligence may be assumed.' (Prosser on Torts, p. 885.)" (Rogers
v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 45 Ca1.2d 414, 419 [289 P.2d
226}.} Plaintiff may have been aware of hazards that would
attend any attempt to start the car by pushing it onto the
highway, and he may have been negligent in exposing himself
to these hazards. There is no evidence, however, that he knew
or must have known of the danger of negligent driving on
the part of defendants, and that he thereby assumed the
risks created by sU$lh conduct.
Plaintiff's most serious objections go to the trial court's
instructions on causation. He contends that the trial court
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erred in instructing the jury on burden of proof by overemphasizing the burden on him and by refusing to instruct
adequately on the doctrine of Summers v. Tice, 33 Ca1.2d 80
[199 P .2d 1, 5 A.L.R.2d 91]. In that case two defendants
negligently discharged shotguns in the direction of the plaintiff, who was injured by a shQt from one of the guns. He
could not determine from which gun the shot came. We hE'ld
that it was not reasonablE' under these circumstances to require
plaintiff to show the cause of his injury. The burden fell on
each defendant to show that his negligence had not caused it
If neither defendant could show that he had not caused the
injury, both were liable.
The rule of Summers v. Tice applies to the facts of the
present case. The jury could have found that defendants
Greenley, Rutkowski, and Alameda were all negligent, or that
anyone of them was negligent. It might well have been unable
to determine, however, which defendant's negligence caused
plaintiff's injuries. They might have been caused by Rutkowski's negligently running into him, or by the collision
between the vehicles of Greenley and Alameda. As in the
Summers case, plaintiff could not identify the cause of his
injuries.
The trial court gave the following instruction:
"When two or more persons by their acts are possibly the
sole cause of a harm, and the plaintiff has introduced evidence
that one of the two or more persons is culpable, then the
defendant has the burden of proving that the other person or
persons were the sale cause of the harm.
"The real reason for the rule that each joint tort feasor
is responsible for the whole damage is the practical unfairness
of denying the injured person redress simply because he can- .
not prove how much damage each did, when it is certain that
between them they did all; let them be the one to apportion
it among themselves. Since, then, the difficulty of proof is
the reason, the rule should apply whenever the harm has
plura] causes, and not merely when they acted in conscious
concert. "2
Other instructions, however, foreclosed the application of
tIt Bhould be noted that this instruction erroneously suggests that
when one of several defendants is known to have caused the plaintiff's
injury, but it cannot be determined which, the burden of proof on the
issue of causation is on all the defendants whether or not their negligence
has been estllhlished. The Summers rule is based on the policy that it
is preferable to hold liahle a negligent defendant who did not in fact
cause the injury than to deny an innorent plaintiff any remedy when it
ClUlDot be determined whieb of the defendants is responsible for the harm
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the Summers rule. The trial court repeatedly instructed the
jury on plaintiff's burden of proof and categoricaBy stated
that if the conflicting probabilities are equal or the evidence
is equally balanced on the issue of negligence or proximate
cause, plaintiff failed to fulfill his burden of proof. These
instructions served to nullify the single instruction on the
rule of the Summers case. There is no merit in defendants'
contention that plaintiff invited the error by offering instructions, which were refused, similar to those uffered by defendants. Plaintiff's refused instructions on burden of proof were
not phrased in categorical terms, and their apt reference to
the other instructions would have enabled the jury to interpret them as subject to the Summers exception.
The trial court also erred in giving the following instruction on intervening cause:
"As you have been instructed, one of the questions we
must decide in finding whether or not one person is liable for
injury to another, is whether or not the conduct in question
was a proximate cause of the injury in question. This inquiry
may involve the conduct of two or more persons acting independently and at different times. To explain the problem presented by such a situation, I shall refer to the person whose
conduct came first in point of time as the first actor and to
the other person as the second actor. If the first actor foresaw,
or by ex.ercising ordinary care would have seen, that a second
actor probably would conduct himself as the second actor
actually did, and also that the combination of the first actor's
conduct and the second actor's conduct probably would cause
injury to a third person, and if the combined conduct did so
result, then each actor's conduct was a concurring proximate
cause of the injury-although, of course, neither would be
liable unless his conduct was negligent. But if the first actor's
conduct alone did not cause the injury, anil if a combination
of results such as I have mentioned was not foreseen by him
as a probability, and was not so foreseeable in the exercise
of ordinary care, then the first actor may not be held liable
for any injury of which the second actor's conduct was a
proximate cause or which may now appear to have resulted
from the combined conduct of both." (Substantially identi·
cal with BAJI, 4th ed., No. l04-C.2.)
but it appears that one of them was. Thi~ poli~y olJ\'iou~ly r()mpel~ tli"
plaintiff first to show that a defendant who may h:l\'e caused the iIJjnry
was negligent, Ilnd this instruction fn j]pd to make thi~ elenr. ThE' error
bears noting even though it eould not have prejuiieed plnintiff in
this ease.

)
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This instruction is riddled with error. It begins innocently enough to speak of the foreseeability of conduct that
may combine with antecedent negligence to produce injury.
It then lurches violently into what the actors actually did,
thus stating the erroneous rule that the identical consequences
must have been foreseeable as a probability (Werkman v.
Bowar.l Zink Corp., 97 Cal.App.2d 418,425 [218 P.2d 43].)
Nor is the concept of probability rescued from limbo b;\'
definition. The jury could infer from the instruction that
the injury must be foreseeable as more probable than not or
that there must be at least a substantial chance of injury.
It may be negligence, however, to create the risk of even a
slight possibility of injury if a reasonably prudent man would
not do so. One may be negligent in not looking before crossing
a railroad track even though trains are infrequent. The rule
extends to foreseeable risks arising out of possible intervt"nin~
conduct of third persons. Thus, in the present CBI'W, if
Greenley was negligent in blocking the highway, it would
be because a reasonably prudent man would foresee the risk
of injury from the intervening conduct of other motorists.
The occurrence of injury from intervening conduct that
should have been foreseen, whether as a probability or as a
possibility, would not insulate Greenley from liability.
(McEvoy v. American Pool Corp., 32 Ca1.2d 295, 299 [195
P.2d 783] ; see Restatement, Torts, § 449.)
The instruction, however, could lead the jury to suppose
that the conduct of Rutkowski or Alameda served to relieve
Greenley of any liability for placing his car partially acrOSN
two lanes of the highway even if they found he was negligent
in so doing. The jury may have concluded that a reasonably
prudent man would not have incurred the risks that Greenley
incurred on the ground that the possibility of harm from
the intervening' conduct of other motorists, even though un·
likely, should have been avoided. They may also have con·
eluded, however, that it was unlikely that Rutkowski and
Alameda would act as they did and absolved Greenley of
liability for negligence solely because the conduct of Rutkowski or Alameda or both was also a cause of plaintiff's
injury. Under these circumstances an instruction on intervening cause had no place in the case. Greenley was either
negligent in failing to anticipate and guard against the con·
duct of other motorists or he was not. If he was, the occur·
rence of that conduct, even if improbable, would not defeat
liability, and by inviting the jury to iind otherwise, the in-
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Itruction gave Greenley the benefit of a defense to which be
was not entitled.
It is also contended that it was error to give an instruction
on unavoidable accident. That question is pending in another
case, and it is not necessary to consider it here in view of
the errors that have already been discussed.
There was enough evidence in the present case to support
a verdict for plaintiff. There is no way of knowing whether
the verdict was based on a finding that his own negligence
contributed to his injuries, on findings that none of the defendants were negligent, on findings that plaintiff had not established that the negligence of any defendant ,'aused his injury,
or, in the case of Greenley, on a finding that the conduct of
Rutkowski or Alameda or both prevented Greenley's negligence from being a proximate cause of the injury. The error
in giving repeated instructions on plaintiff's burden of proof
that foreclosed the application of the rule of Summers v. Pice,
supra, coupled with the fact that there was no direct evidence
as to how plaintiff was injured, could have led to erroneous
findings that plaintiff had not sustained his burden of proof
on the issue of causation. The instruction permitting the jury
to find for Greenley on the defense of intervening cause,
although there was no evidence to support this defense,
coupled with the fact that the instruction erroneously suggested to the jury that the issue should be resolved in Greenley's favor, could also have led to the verdict in his favor.
Accordingly, it is impos.c~ible to determine whether the verdict
was based on correct· instructions on the issues of negligence
and contributory negligence, on erroneous instructions on the
burden of proof on causation or, in the case of Greenley, on
the erroneous determination of a question of law improperly
left to the jury. Under these circumstances it has heretofore
been settled that the error is prejudicial. (Miller v. Peters,
37 Ca1.2d 89, 95 [230 P.2d 803] ; Clement v. State Reclamation Board, 35 Cal.2d 628, 644 [220 P.2d 897] ; Edwards v.
Freeman, 34 Ca1.2d 589, 594 [212 P.2d 883]; Buehotter v.
Follett, 27 Ca1.2d 765, 770-771 [167 P.2d 193] ; Oettinger v.
Stewart,24 Ca1.2d 133,140 [148 P.2d 19, 156 A.L.R. 1221].)
I would reverse the judgment.
Gibson, C. J., and Carter, J., concurred.
Appellant?s petition for a rehearing was denied February
26, 1958.. Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and Traynor, J., were of
the opinion that the petition should be granted.

